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PERPETUITIES AND REMAINDERS
THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND
LEGAL CONTINGENT REMAINDERS IN MISSOURI*
CHARLES E. CULLEN- AND LESLIE H. FISHER*
For almost a century there has been a controversy between
two groups of law writers and judges over the applicability of
the modern rule against perpetuities to legal contingent remaind-
ers., The participants on both sides of the issue have been promi-
nent in the field of real property. In some jurisdictions the mat-
ter has been settled by statutes making contingent remainders
indestructible, or by judicial decision. In those where the com-
mon law has not been so changed the problem remains unsolved
or in a worse condition, that of uncertainty. An examination and
discussion 1) of the historical background, 2) of the arguments
of the scholars, and 3) of some leading cases is herewith pre-
sented for consideration in connection with this narrow and
technical part of the law of future interests. There is necessarily
brought into the discussion the validity of what has been called
the corumon law rule against remoteness, but what is better
known today as the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell.2 In that case the
rule was stated by Kay, J., as follows: "You cannot limit an
estate to an unborn person for life with remainder to the chl-
dren of that unborn person, for that such remainder is bad."' 3
On one side, it is asserted that this was an established rule of
the common law affecting contingent remainders ;31 on the other
hand, it is alleged that no such rule was established as a separate
incident to contingent remainders and not only is its use an
* This article was suggested by the thesis which was awarded the Mary
Hitchock Thesis Prize of 1936 entitled "Applicability of the Modern Rule
Against Perpetuities To Legal Contingent Remainders Where Such Inter-
ests Have Not Been Indestructible, as in Missouri" written by Mr. Leslie
Hawes Fisher. Professor Charles E. Cullen, under whose direction and
supervision the thesis was written, has condensed and revised the original
treatment for publication. Some independent ideas of Professor Cullen have
been incorporated into this article.
t Professor of Law, Washington University.
$ Member St. Louis, Missouri Bar.
1. From 1843, when W. D. Lewis published, The Law of Perpetuities,
down to the article by F. E. Farrer, 51 L. Q. Rev. 668 (1935).
2. 42 Ch. D. 494 (1889); 44 Ch. D. 85 (1890).
3. Ibid, 1. c. 501.
3a. Frazer, Rationale of the Rule against Perpetuities (1922) 6 Minn.
L. Rev. 560, 566, and note 26.
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error, but its very existence is without sound authority to sup-
port it3b
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. An examination of the development of the fee tail and of
its characteristics and purposes establishes the necessity for and
the creation of a common law remedy by the courts based on
destructibility and not on remoteness of vesting which is the
basis of the modern rule against perpetuities.
Pre-Norman common law imposed few restraints, if any, upon
the alienation of land.4 Estates of a restricted inheritance be-
came well established and very prevalent under the feudal sys-
tem introduced by the Normans. The purpose of these estates
was both to restrain alienation and to perpetuate familial hold-
ing of land. Opposition to such policies led to the contest between
the supporters of restraints on alienation and the advocates of
its free and unfettered enjoyment which lasted for centuries.
The early transfers of land restricting the inheritance to a par-
ticular class of heirs of the transferee, such as to the heirs of
his body or the heirs male of his body, if literally interpreted,
would restrain alienation and tend to perpetuate the landed inter-
est in his descendants or, by reversion, in the donor and his
family. To defeat such an interpretation and its purposes, the
courts construed such an interest as a fee conditional, i. e., a
fee simple upon a condition precedent that the donee have the
type of lineal descendants prescribed in the gift. If the trans-
feree died without having had the issue prescribed, the lands
would revert to the transferor. By having the specified issue,
the condition precedent was satisfied for three purposes, to wit:
to alien, to forfeit, and to charge. After the performance of the
condition the grantee could by alienation, not only bar his own
issue, but could bar the possibility of reverter in the grantorY
The statute De Donis Conditionalibus, sometimes referred to
as the statute of Westminster II,6 was passed in order to prevent
alienation of the fee conditional and to ensure the reversion to
the over lord on failure of the issue specified. The statute enacted
3b. Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915) sec. 298 h.
4. Digby, History of the Law of Real Property (5th ed. 1897) 28.
5. Ibid, p. 223.




in substance that the will of the donor as expressed in the form
of the gift should be observed. The land was declared to revert
if there never was issue, if such issue failed, or if the heirs of
the body of such issue failed. There could be no reversion to the
donor so long as there were lineal descendants of the donee, but
the donee had no power to alienate the land or bar his issue, and
issue meant any descendants. The donee no longer had a condi-
tional fee simple. It was a new estate, a fee tail, i. e., a fee from
which the general heirs were entirely cut off. Thus restraints on
alienation were restored and familial perpetuities legalized.
Although it has been declared, 7 "that the reluctant spirit of
English liberty would not submit to the statute of entails and
Westminster Hall siding with liberty, found means to evade it,"
it was not until Taltarum's Case8 that relief was obtained
through a bold extension of the judicial power. It was held in
that case that an estate tail might be barred, i. e., the entail cut
off, by reason of the intended recompense which a common re-
covery was supposed to give to those who, by the terms of the
gift, were entitled to inherit the land. A common recovery re-
moved all limitations or restraints upon an entailed estate and
passed an unqualified fee. By such a conveyance the tenant in
tail could bar his own issue and all subsequent remainders. Es-
tates tail and contingent remainders after an estate tail thus
became destructible and remained so until modern times.,
Efforts to escape the effects of common recoveries brought
about provisions in conveyances containing restraints and con-
ditions against taking such action to defeat estates tail, but the
courts maintained their stand by holding that any device or con-
dition restricting recoveries was void because it tended to a
perpetuity. The origin of the term "perpetuity" is obscure. It
was used in Chudleigh's Case", and while it cannot be assumed
7 Duke of Marlborough v. Earl of Godolphin, 1 Eden 404, 417, 28 Eng.
Rep. 741 (Ch. 1759).
8. Y. B. 12 Ed. 4, 19 (1473).
9. In England by statute, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 8 (1845), and 40 & 41 Vict.
c. 33 (1877). Contingent remainders were made indestructible and placed
in the category of executory limitations.
10. 1 Co. Rep. 113b, 76 Eng. Rep. 261 (K. B. 1594). "The term 'per-
petuity' summed up in a single word all that the judges had struggled
against in their fight for the alienability of land. It gave a name to what
had been up to that time an inarticulate principle." Bordwell, The Iowa
Contingent Remainder Act (continued, 1925) 10 Ia. Law Bull. 275, 280.
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that the term was never used on any previous occasion, Mr.
Holdsworth, in an article, An Elizabethan Bill Against Perpetui-
ties,1 says that the case directed public attention to the topic.
The bill never was enacted into law, but the marginal note shows
the attitude of its originator:
"Forasmuch as perpetuities by creating future uses happen-
ing long after engender discord and faction in families make
children disobedient parents unnatural, upon conceit yt the
lands stand secured"
"And this by reason of a construction of the Statute 27
H. 8 being against ye meanings throf whereby greate suites
have and doe arise"
"Enactet, yt all limitation of uses for restraining persons
yt have estates of inheritance in landes from selling or de-
mising them shalbe voide."
The concept that restraints on alienation constitute perpetuities
runs through most of the decisions in the cases which involved
attempts to get away from the effects of the decision in Talta-
rum's Case.12 An ultimate remainder to the Crown did not in-
validate a common recovery by the present tenant in Cholmley's
Case. 3 Provisions that if the tenant in tail attempted to bar the
entail, his interest should cease as if he were dead were held
void.14 Finally in Mary Portington's Case5 a limitation in the
will of a testator was presented which provided that on the per-
formance of any act contrary to that will, the estate of the per-
son so doing would cease as if he or she were dead without an
heir of his or her body. This, if upheld, might have created a
11. 21 L. Q. Rev. 258 (1919).
12. Marlborough v. Godolphin, 1 Eden 404, 409, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch.
1759) ; Note S to Corbet's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 83b (K. B. 1599), 76 Eng. Rep.
188, reads: "A perpetuity is where, though all who have interest shouldjoin in a conveyance, they could not bar or pass the estate."
13. 2 Co. Rep. 50a, 76 Eng. Rep. 533 (K. B. 1597).
14. Corbet's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 83b, 76 Eng. Rep. 187 (K. B. 1599); Mild-
ways' Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311 (K. B. 1606); Marlborough v.
Godolphin, 1 Eden 404, 409, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 (K. B. 1759).
15. 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. Rep. 976 (K. B. 1614). The court found
the authorities cited in Scholastica's Case, 2 Plowd. Comm. 403 (1572)
contra to that for which they were cited and overruled that case, saying:
"the common recovery leaves a judgment against the tenant in tail and
another judgment against the vouchee to have in value; and these resolu-
tions produced the judgment in Taltrum's Case, Y. B. 12 Ed. 4 (1473)
which was not of any new invention, but proved and approved the resolu-
tions of the sages of the law then perceiving what the contentions and
mischiefs had crept into the quiet of the law by these fettered inheritances."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss1/1
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determinable fee tail.,' The court held the restraint invalid.
Speaking of this case, Lord Coke, in the preface to the tenth part
of the reports, said:
"Then have I published in Mary Portington's case, for the
general good both of the prince and country, the honorable
funeral of fond and new-found perpetuities-a monsterous
brood carved out of mere invention, and never known to the
ancient sages of the law. I say monsterous, for that the
naturalist saith, quod monstra generantur propter corrupti-
onem alicujus principii; and yet I say honorable, for these
vermin have crept into many honorable families. At whose
solemn funeral I was present, accompanied the dead to the
grave of oblivion, but mourned not, for that the common-
wealth rejoiced, that fettered freeholds and inheritances
were set at liberty, and many and manifold inconveniences
to the head and all the members of the commonwealth there-
by avoided."
Thereafter an unbarrable entail was impossible, 17 because, as a
perpetuity it was repugnant to the common law.
Since an infant could not suffer a common recovery or in any
other way defeat the entail until he was 21 years of age, it must
be clear that one transferring property could not control its dis-
position for a period longer than 21 years after present lives.
Thus a tiansfer of an estate to A for life would limit that estate
and it could be protected by a contingent remainder to trustees
for the life of A, but a remainder in tail to A's eldest or other
son, contingent on there being such a taker, could not be limited
as a contingent remainder in tail and remain unbarrable after
the tenant in tail reached his majority. Thus the hostility to
perpetuities shown in the policy of the common law courts de-
veloped an implied limiU iN fact, beyond which any attempted
restraint on alienation would be void as a perpetuity. Many
writers and judges 8 have said that the time limit fixed in the
modern rule against perpetuities was not a new rule developed
by the courts but was an adaptation of the above time limit
placed upon the power to postpone a complete bar of an entailed
16. Fearne, Coitbge)2t Remwzders (4th Am. ed. from 10th London ed.
1845) 259.
17. The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt., in English (George Wilson,
ed. 1777) page vi, part 10. See article, Sweet, Perpetuities (1899) 15 Law
Q. Rev. 258.
18. Hargrave, note 5 to 1 Co. Lit. (1st Am. ed. from 19th London ed.
1853) 20a. See note 46, post.
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interest at common law. It is believed that the existence of a
recognized common law limit to restraints on alienation which
long preceded the modern rule against perpetuities is discernible
in the period covered above.
It would seem that the source of the rule in Whitby v. Mitl ell
is in this same implication. It need not have found expression as
such, to be what Justice Kay called an established rule of the
common law. A common law conveyance must have recognized
that, if the owner of land could not restrain its alienation, in any
disposition he might make of it as an entail, beyond a life and
21 years, he could not do so for a longer period, i. e., for the
whole life of an unborn child of an unborn person to whom a
life estate had been limited. If asked to incorporate it in a con-
veyance he would reject it as an attempt to prevent the barring
of an entail beyond the recognized limits. 8a It is believed that
to avoid this limitation on the power of disposition, a devise in
the form of a series of life estates limited to successive issue of
an unborn person was construed in some instances to be an
estate tail in the first unborn taker under the cy pres doctrine.19
It is as logical to conclude that, under the generous attitude to-
ward a devisor, his inartistic effort to create an entail by such
a disposition would be saved by treating it as a barrable entail,
as the conclusion that it was so construed in order to escape the
effect of the modern rule against perpetuities. Destructibility
was clearly the antidote for restraints on alienation by means
of entails, then called perpetuities.
B. The destructibility of contingent remainders met the same
need for protection against perpetuities that had been satisfied
by the insistence on the destructibility of estates tail. The
remedy at common law was adequate to meet the dangers of
18a. This was the very situation -which arose in Re Frost. See statement
by Kay, 5., 43 Ch. D. 246, 251 (1889).
"The rule was an outgrowth of the English family settlement and of the
tradition of the small group of conveyancing specialists which the English
family settlement produced." It "is thought to have made such an impres-
sion on conveyancers in England that as much as they would have liked to,
they were afraid to limit land to successive generations of unborn children."
Bordwell, The Iowa Contingent Remainder Act (continued, 1925) 10 Ia. Law
Bull. 275.
19. W. D. Lewis, Law of Perpetuities (1843) 426; Gray, Rule Against
Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915) 643-670; llumberston v. Humberston, 1 P. Win.




perpetuities and did not require the application of the rule
against remoteness to contingent remainders.
The definition of a common law remainder in Coke on Little-
ton, "A remnant of an estate in lands or tenements expectant
upon a particular estate created together with the same at one
time ' 1 is familiar to the profession. A contingent remainder
has been defined in the following manner: "A remainder is con-
tingent if, in order for it to become a present estate, the fulfill-
ment of some condition precedent, other than the determination
of the preceding estate is necessary."' 21 "The history of con-
tingent remainders is obscure" 22 but their validity seems to have
been first legally recognized about 1430,23 which is between two
hundred and two hundred and fifty years before the modern rule
against perpetuities began to receive definite form.24 During
that period the destructibility of contingent remainders seems
to have been adequate protection against perpetuities that might
arise therefrom. It is generally conceded that the modern rule
against perpetuities owed its existence to the creation of indes-
tructible future interests made possible by judicial interpreta-
tion after the Statutes of Uses and of Wills.5
20. 1 Coke, Commentary on Littleton (1st Am. ed. 1853) 143b; see also
Tiedeman, The Anrican Law of Real Property (4th ed. 1924) sec. 296.
21. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sees. 9, 101. A. M.
Kale differed with Gray on the definition. See ibid. note 3, sec. 101. A con-
tingent remainder is not an estate, but a possibilty of an estate. Ibid., sec.
113b.
22. Digby, History of the Law of Real Property (5th ed. 1897) 265.
23. Williams, Law of Real Property (17th ed. 1894) 411, 412; Holds-
worth, History of English Law (3rd ed. 1925) 135; Y. B. 9 Hen. 6 (1431)
Trin. pl. 19.
24. The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682),
is usually regarded as the landmark in this regard. Gray, Rule Against
Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sec. 170.
25. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) 136. "Although no
question of remoteness was presented in Pells v. Brown, it is hard to esti-
mate its influence on the subsequent history of conveyancing. Had it been
held that conditional limitations could be destroyed like contingent re-
mainders, the need of a rule against remoteness might never have been
felt; even if some such rule had been finally evolved, it would probably have
been in other than its present form.
"To the third point, Doderidge held, that this recovery would bar Wil-
liam; for he had but a possibility to have a fee, and quasi a contingent
estate, which is destroyed by this recovery before it came in esse: for
otherwise it would be a mischievous kind of perpetuity which could not by
any means be destroyed. * * * But all the other justices were herein
against him, that this recovery shall not bind." Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac.
590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K. B. 1620).
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Let us examine the various modes in which contingent re-
mainders could be eliminated, or, as is commonly said, destroyed.
They may be divided into two classes.
a. Destruction of contingent remainders by failure of the
contingency to happen on or before the termination of the
prior supporting freehold.
A common law contingent remainder is a successive interest
which must comply with the old requirement that there could be
no interruption in the seisin and seisin must be in some one at
common law in order to sustain alienation by livery thereof. A
common law contingent remainder must vest on or before the
termination of the prior supporting freehold, and if it does not
do so, it "falls in," i. e., is entirely destroyed. Then seisin, with
the power of alienation is in the reversioner. Contingent execu-
tory limitations arising after the Statutes of Uses and of Wills
presented the same problem until they were held indestructible.
The necessity, both before and after the statutes mentioned, for
continuity in seisin was a safeguard against the creation of per-
petuities by contingent remainders.2 Continuity of seisin was
as vital to alienability of a freehold as it was to the continuity
of responsibility for the incidents of feudal tenure.
It would be impossible for any contingent remainder limited
after a vested life estate to vest at too remote a time, when the
common law rules applicable to contingent remainders required
that they vest on or before the death of the life tenant. If a
series of contingent remainders to successive issue of an unborn
person to whom an estate for life has been limited were indes-
tructible, alienation could be restrained indefinitely since they
would not then "fall in" if they failed to vest on or before the
end of the supporting vested freehold. Perpetuities would thus
be made possible.26
b. Destruction of contingent remainders by other means
or events than the failure of the contingency to happen in
due time.
26. Frazer, Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities (1922) 6 Minn.
L. Rev. 560, 567. Fearne, Contingent Remainders (4th Am. ed. 1845) 497
and 788a.
26a. "Three examples of perpetuity which the judges in Corbet's Case
and in Chudleigh's Case seem to have had in mind were the unbarrable
entail, the indestructible contingent or executory interest and the perpetual
freehold. The perpetual freehold was a limitation of life estates to succes-
sive generations of heirs." Bordwell, Contingent Remainder Act (1925)
10 Ia. L. Bull. 275, 281.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss1/1
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This is an extension of the preceding common law principle
by a validation of the destruction of contingent remainders
through acts of the parties or other circumstances which pre-
vented the contingency on which the remainder was limited from
happening on or before the termination of the prior supporting
estate. There were many of such acts and circumstances, so that
a contingent remainderman could hardly be considered to have
had an interest fettering and restraining the alienation of prop-
erty in the common law sense of a perpetuity. If the prior tenant
made a feoffment,27 levied a fine,28 suffered a common recovery ;29
or if there was a merger of his particular estate and the rever-
sionary interest,-", or an extinguishment of the particular estate
27. Chudleigh Case, 1 Co. Rep. 113b, 135b, 76 Eng. Rep. 261 (K. B.
1594): "By feoffment of the tenants for life, their estate was determined,
and title of entry given for the forfeiture, and then those in the future
remainder were not in esse to take it; for this reason, these remainders in
future, by this matter ex post facto, were utterly destroyed and made
void; and there is no difference when the estate of the tenant for life deter-
mines by the deatL of the tenant for life, and when it determines in right
by his forfeiture; for, in both cases, entry is given to him in the next re-
mainder, and then if he cannot take the land when the particular estate
determines the remainder is void." Also in Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b,
76 Eng. Rep. 146 (K. B. 1598), "inasmuch as by the feoffment of Robert,
his estate for life was determined by a condition in law annexed to it, and
cannot be revived afterwards by any possibility; for this reason the con-
tingent remainder is destroyed." Any person in possession could by livery
of seisin effect a tortious feoffment and vest the fee simple in the feoffee.
A feoffment was the only form of conveyance which had this effect. See
Coke on Litt. (1st Am. ed. 1853) 611. If he limited a less estate to the
feoffee a tortious reversion vested in himself. Since the statute of 8 & 9
Vict. c. 106 s. 4 (1846) a feoffment can have no tortious operation in
England and it only conveys as much as the grantor had to convey.
28. Digby, History of the Law of Real Property (5th ed. 1897) 105, 229
n. 2,253.
29. King v. Melling, 3 Salk. 297, 91 Eng. Rep. 835 (Q. B. 1695). Where
B the life tenant suffered a common recovery it was held a recovery will
not bar the right of a mortgagee, unless he is vouched, so likewise of an
executory devise; but it will bar a contingent remainder."
30. Crump ex dem. Woolley v. Norwood, 7 Taunt. 362, 129 Eng. Rep.
L15 C. P. 1815), it was held that a contingent remainder with double
aspect was destroyed by merger of the particular estate which supported it.
Where a married woman was tenant for life, remainder to her son, if one
should be born. The reversioner in fee, before the birth of a son, conveyed
his reversion to the wife and the husband. The court said, the wife's life
estate was merged in the fee simple and all contingent remainders were
therefore destroyed. Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wins. Saunders 380, 85 Eng.
Rep. 1181 (K. B. 1671). An illustration of a companion idea is to be found
in Thompson v. Leach, 2 Vent. 198, 86 Eng. Rep. 391 (C. B. 1691), where
the tenant of a particular estate surrendered his estate to the reversioner
in fee or to a vested remainderman in fee. There the surrender was void
because the tenant for life was a lunatic, but the court said that otherwise
the contingent remainder would have been destroyed by this surrender. See
1936]
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by reentry for condition broken,3 1 or an alteration in the quantity
of the particular estate,32 or a descent of the reversion upon the
particular estate,33 the contingent remainder "fell in" because of
the removal of the supporting freehold.
Destructibility of contingent remainders was, therefore, a suffi-
cient protection against perpetuities, as the latter were under-
stood prior to the Statute of Uses, for two centuries or more be-
fore the modern rule against perpetuities took its present form.
The doctrine of remoteness is inseparable from indestructibility
but is not essential where the future interest is not so protected
that it cannot be destroyed34 Had there been no "recognized
rule" of the common law, later expressed in the case of Whitby
v. Mitchell, making invalid a series of life estates to successive
issue of an unborn person to whom a life estate had been limited,
perpetuities in that form would have awaited for three centuries
a relief under the modern rule, and they would have received the
same kind of notoriety that Chudleigh's Case", produced. That
they did not receive such notice supports to some extent an infer-
ence that there was such a recognized rule, in the minds of com-
mon law lawyers, as Fearne set forth.36
C. The modern rule against perpetuities, sometimes called
the rule against remoteness owes its origin and development
to the rise of indestructible future interests.
After the Statutes of Uses and of Wills, efforts of attorneys for
landed proprietors to get around the indestructibility of con-
tingent remainders were made by limiting remainders by way
of use. The courts, however, for some time held such limitations
subject to the same rules as remainders and destructible in the
same ways.37 The principle was laid down that any limitation
Fearne, Contingent Remainders (4th Am. ed. from 10th London ed., 1845)
c. 5, 515.
31. Cogan v. Cogan, Cro. Eliz. 360, 78 Eng. Rep. 608 (K. B. 1892);
Sheffield v. Orrery, 3 Atk. 282, 26 Eng. Rep. 965 (Ch. 1745).
32. Case CCCLXIV, 4 Leo. 237, 74 Eng. Rep. 843 (K. B. 1591).
33. This is true where the descent is only mediate from the person whose
will created the particular estate and the remainder. Kent v. Harpool, 1
Vent. 360, 86 Eng. Rep. 197 (K. B. 1678).
34. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sec. 192.
35. Note 11, supra.
36. Fearne, Contingent Rerainders (4th Am. ed. 1845) 502.
37. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sec. 142-146; Chud-




which could be construed as a remainder should be held to be a
remainder and subject to its incidents2 8 Early in the seven-
teenth century, however, decisions validating executory limita-
tions in terms and freeholds, other than remainders limited by
way of use,3 were handed down.40 Perpetuities were thus made
possible and it became necessary for the courts, in pursuance of
the profound public policy against perpetuities, to check and
destroy them. Gray has traced the decisions-' from the Duke of
Norfolk's Case 4 in 1682 down to Cadell v. Palmer43 in 1833,
showing how the rule developed into its present form: "No inter-
est is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-
one years after some life in being at the creation of the inter-
est."'4 Throughout his treatment of the Rule Against Perpetni-
ties, Gray maintains that during this period there was developed
an entirely new rule based on remoteness, i. e., fixing legal limits
on the time to which the vesting of any contingent future inter-
est may be postponed.45
Another view, advanced by numerous writers and judges, is
.38. Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Win. Saunders 768, 781 (1669); Coke, Corn-
entary on Littleton (1st Am. ed. 1853) 217; Fearne, Contingent Re-
nuinders (4th Am. ed. 1845) 284; 7 Holdsworth, History of English Law
(1926) 126, 127, Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) Appen-
dix J.
39. Adams v. Savage, 2 Ld. Raymond 854, 92 Eng. Rep. 71 (K. B. 1703);
Goodtitle v. Billington 2 Doug. 758, 99 Eng. Rep. 481 (K. B. 1781).
40. Mannings Case, 8 Co. Rep. 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 618 (K. B. 1609), and
Lampet's Case 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (K. B. 1612), held that
an executory devise of a term was valid and indestructible. Pells v. Brown
Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K. B. 1620), held that executory interests
in a freehold other than contingent uses were indestructible. Gray, Rule
Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sec. 158, discussing Child v. Baylie,
Cro. Jac. 459, 460, 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (K. B. 1623), says that only one of
twelve judges considered remoteness as affecting the validity of a limita-
tion. Davenport said there was no danger of a perpetuity since the con-
tingency ought to happen in the life of the devises, "but if the contingency
-is to commence in futuro after the death of the first devisee, there, be-
cause such limitation tends to make a perpetuity, a remainder limited on
it is bad." It took some time after the decision in Pells v. Brown to develop
the limitation on remoteness of vesting.
41. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sees. 159-189.
42. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
43. 1 Cl. & Fiu. 372, 36 Eng. Rep. 128 (H. L. 1833).
44. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) see. 201. Cadell v.
Palmer, supra, note 43, settled the maximum period for remoteness of
vesting. It was held that the 21 years was a period in gross, irrespective
of minority, but that gestation must in fact exist in order to take advantage
of the additional months allowed therefor.
45. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sec. 1 and sees. 268-
278.
19361
Washington University Open Scholarship
42 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22
that the modern rule against perpetuities is merely an extension
and adaptation of a well established principle to meet new needs
unknown to the common law.4  Thus Justice Farwell in Re
Ashforth says, "Although, therefore, there Nyas a general prin-
ciple that alienation should not be restricted by the creation of
estates beyond a particular estate for life witk a remainder in
fee or in tail, I can find no trace of any statement of the present
rule in terms in any of the old books. But the general principle
was well established and as the ingenuity of the real property
lawyers invented new devices for rendering land inalienable for
as long a time as possible, it became necessary to mould the ex-
pression of the old law so as to meet new emergencies" and after
citing Cadell v. Palmer7 and Long v. Blackall41 to the same effect,
he continues, "here, then, is authoritative statement in terms of
precision of the rule of law which had existed for centuries, but
had not been theretofore defined, and had been applied from time
to time, as occasion arose, by judges, who without formulation
of the precise limits of the rule, held, as Lord Nottingham said
in the Duke of Norfolk's Case49 'If it tend to a perpetuity, there
46. Hargrave says the period of lives in being and 21 years plus gesta-
tion period where necessary is, "a limitation not arbitrarily prescribed by
our courts of justice, but wisely and reasonably adopted in analogy to the
case of freeholds of inheritance which cannot be so limited by way of re-
mainder as to postpone a complete bar to an entail, by fine or recovery for
a longer space. Notes to Coke on Littleton (1st Am. ed. 1853) 20a, n. 5.
2 Bl. Comm. c. 11, p. 174. Sheppard's, Touchstone of Common Assurances
(1st Am. ed. 1808) contains the same statement. Digby, History of the Law
of Real Property (5th ed. 1887) 364 states the following: "It has already
been seen that the creation of future estates by ways of remainder is
limited by the rule that an estate given to an unborn person for life can-
not be followed by any estate given to any child of such unborn person. It
followed from this that the great object of settlements of lands, the pre-
serving them in the settlor's family, could be obtained only to the extent
of giving an estate tail to an unborn member of the family. But this estate
after the introduction of the practice of suffering recoveries was always
liable to be turned into a fee simple and alienated, so soon as the tenant
in tail came of age. The result was that settlements operating by way of
remainder could not absolutely prevent the alienation of lands for a longer
period than during a life or lives in being and 21 years after." The same
idea is mentioned in Porter v. Bradley 3 T. R. 146, 100 Eng. Rep. 502
(1789); Marlborough v. Godolphin 1 Eden 404, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 (1759);
Chapman v. Brown 3 Burr. 1626, 97 Eng. Rep. 1015 (1765); Long v.
Blackall 7 T. R. 100, 101 Eng. Rep. 875 (1797); Thellusson v. Woodford
4 Ves. 227, 11 Ves. 112, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805). S~e
supra, note 18.
47. Supra, note 43.
48. Long v. Backall, 7 T. R. 100, 101 Eng. Rep. 875 (K. B. 1797).
49. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss1/1
PERPETUITIES AND REMAINDERS
needs be no more said..'." The following was said in Porter
v. Bradley:5'
"This rule was adopted in analogy to legal formal limita-
tions, namely, for a life or lives in being, with a remainder
in tail to unborn children who cannot bar it till twenty-one;
and the fraction of another year since the Statute of Wil-
liam, if tenant for life should leave his wife enceinte."
From the numerous statements quoted above, it seems estab-
lished that there was a common acceptance of the analogy theory
among writers and lawyers in England.62 The periods prove to
be the same, but the emphasis is on a different phase in the new
rule, remoteness of vesting. The rule against perpetuities was
still aimed at preventing unreasonable restraints on alienation.
"So the rule against perpetuities took the form of a rule against
remoteness in vesting, but its object was to prevent an unreason-
able postponement of the power of alienation by a present tenant
entitled to the fee. And where that object is not served the rule
should not apply."
II.
The conflict of opinions regarding the applicability of the
modern rule against perpetuities to legal contingent re-
mainders.
Lewis and Gray are the outstanding representatives of the
school of thought which maintains that the modern rule against
perpetuities applies to contingent remainders . 4 Lewis was first
to conceive and expound the idea, and states that his theory
then seemed "strange and novel to the profession."'55 Gray has
done more than anyone else to develop and promulgate it and it
is unquestionably the majority view at the present time. He
evidently thinks that destructibility was effective as a remedy
against perpetuities. He says:
50. In Re Ashforth, 1 Ch. 535 (1905).
51. 3 T. R 146, 100 Eng. Rep. 502 (1789).
52. There was the same general acceptance of the doctrine of Whitby v.
Mitchell, evidenced as early as Fearne's famous illustration, Contingent Re-
wqtiders (4th Am. ed. 1845) 502.
.53. Frazer, Rationale of the Rule against Perpetuities (1922) 6 Minn.
L. Rev. 560, 570.
54. Lewis, Lto, of Peepetdty (1843) ; Supplement to same (1849) ; Gray,
The Rule Agahnst Pei-petuities (1st ed. 1886); (2nd ed. 1906); (3rd ed.
1915).
5. Lewis, Lau, of Perpetduty (Supplement, 1849) p. 97.
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"That for a long time no question with regard to remote-
ness arose on remainders is not surprising. Remainder there
could be none after an estate in fee simple; a remainder
after a fee tail could be barred at will; a contingent re-
mainder after a life estate could practically be barred by a
fine, and no contingent remainder was good after an estate
for years. The reason why so many cases of remoteness
arose concerning executory devises and other conditional
limitations is that they were indestructible. The destructi-
bility of legal remainders prevented any question arising
concerning their remoteness." 6
and in another place he adds:
"It is true that the indestructibility of executory devises
led to the establishment of the rule against perpetuities,
while the case with which contingent remainders might be
destroyed prevented or postponed the starting of any ques-
tion as to their remoteness. 5 7
With regard to the tortious destruction of the preceding estate
in order to defeat a subsequent contingent remainder, he says:
"The docking of an estate tail is a lawful act, which no
condition can restrain, while on the other hand, a tortious
conveyance by a tenant for life exposes him to a forfeiture
of his estate" and "If a trustee to support contingent re-
mainders joins in a conveyance to destroy them he commits
a breach of trust."58
That such was the effect of the actions spoken of is true, but it
does not alter the fact that the destruction of contingent re-
mainders in those and other ways was recognized as effective by
the common law courts in numerous cases.5 The breach of trust
might be a strong deterrent, but even if the trustees would not
join in the conveyance, the common law attitude toward perpe-
tuities was a preventative. "If there are trustees to support con-
tingent remainders, the remainder cannot be barred by the ten-
ant for life nor can it be conveyed by the remainder man until
he attain the age of twenty-one." 60 Here we have evidence of a
recognition of a time limit, the result of hostility toward re-
56. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sec. 192.
57. Ibid., sec. 285.
58. Ibid., see. 285.
59. Fearne, Contingent Remainders (4th Am. ed. 1845) Chapter V, pages
316-380.
60. Lord Northington in Marlborough v. Godolphin, 1 Eden 404, 418, 419,
28 Eng. Rep. 741 (1759). See supra, note 46.
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straints on alienation, and of its effectiveness in the minds of
the bar as a preventative of perpetuities, just as in the case of
unbarrable entails.61
Gray dismisses the contention that the destructibility of con-
tingent remainders made unnecessary the application to them
of the modern rule against perpetuities thus:
"But it is needless to discuss this theory, the unsoundness
of which Mr. Lewis has exposed, for both in England and
very generally in America contingent remainders have by
statute ceased to be destructible. If they were exempted
from the operation of the rule against perpetuities, because
they could be destroyed, now that they have become inde-
structible, they must fall within it. ' '62
This view is justified where legislation has changed contingent
remainders to indestructible interests and put them in a class
with executory devises, and executory limitations by way of
use." But where the common law legal contingent remainder is
still a valid subsisting interest it must have a freehold to sup-
port it, and is subject to the common law rules of destructibility.
Lewis, however, says "The test ordinarily allowed for deter-
mining the presence or absence of the danger of perpetuities in
respect to future limitations, is not their capacity of being alien-
ated, but of being destroyed."" This statement tends to weaken
much of his argument that contingent remainders should be sub-
ject to the modern rule against perpetuities. Again he says,
"Now, it is apprehended that the contention we have been
last considering, was-not that there might be a Perpetuity
in the form of a remainder, but-that there was an inci-
dental circumstance which averted from such a remainder
the risk of becoming a Perpetuity. It was not said there was
any direct independent rule of law which excluded a re-
mainder from thegeneral scope of the Rule against Perpetui-
ties, but that, while prima facie within the rule, it was in
fact, exempted on the ground of one of its legal incidents
which indirectly satisfied the purpose of the rule. That legal
incident no longer exists."6
61. See supra, note 46.
62. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) see. 286.
63. See supra, note 9, for English statutes; Gray, Rule Against Perpe-
tuities (3rd ed. 1915) Appendices B and C; Contingent Remainders; In-
roads made by legislation and judicial decision in the United States upon
the rule of destructibility. 11 Cornell L. Q. 408 (1926).
64. Lewis, Lau, of Perpetuity (Supplement, 1849) n. 19.
65. Ibid., p. 134,
19361
Washington University Open Scholarship
46 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22
The last sentence alludes to the English legislation of 1844
abolishing the destructibility of contingent remainders by for-
feiture, surrender, or merger. 6 Like Gray, Lewis considers the
matter settled by the abolition of destructibility by statute. In
reply to the question why objections based on remoteness had not
arisen earlier, Mr. Gray answers that there was no need for it."'
He adds: "Even had contingent remainders been more frequent,
the ease with which the tenant for life could, by feoffment, fine,
or recovery, destroy the particular estate necessary to support a
contingent remainder would have prevented their becoming prac-
tically inconvenient, however remote."
As to the so-called rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, that a contingent
remainder for life to an unborn person cannot be followed by a
remainder to such person's child, Gray finds no authority to sup-
port it as a rule of the common law.68 He answered Sweet's argu-
ments "' in his third editions and in the note thereto regards
such a rule as "a cantilena of lawyers based on insufficient
authority" or "an example of communis error fecit ju." Cer-
tainly if this is true the common error was regarded as law by
a numerous group of otherwise able jurists and writers includ-
ing Fearne upon whom Lewis relied.' 0 Thus Lewis depended
upon what is an example of the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell used
by Fearne long before that case was decided. The statement of
Fearne is as follows:71
"Here indeed it may not be improper to remark once for
all, that any limitation in future, or by way of remainder of
lands of inheritance, which in its nature tends to a perpet-
uity, even although there be a preceding vested estate of
freehold, so as to take it out of the description of an execu-
tory devise, is by our courts considered as void in its crea-
tion; as in the case of a limitation of lands in succession,
first to a person in esse, and after his decease to his unborn
children, and afterwards to the children of such unborn chil-
dren, this last remainder is absolutely void and there is no
carrying of the estate to them in the extent of the estate
66. 8 and 9 Vict., c. 106, s. S. See also notes 9 and 63, supra.
67. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sec. 134.
68. Ibid., sections 125-133, 298a-298i.
68a. Sweet, Perpetuities (1899) 5 Law Q. Rev. 71, and others cited by
Gray, note 69.
69. Ibid. Appendix K, sec. 931 et seq.
70. Lewis, Law of Perpetuity (Supplement 1849) 121.
71. Fearne, Contingent Remainders (4th Am. ed. 1845) 502.
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limited to their parents, namely, to the unborn children of
a person in esse, and estate of inheritance, which is an estate
tail."
Kay, J. in the case of Re Frost simplified matters by merely
quoting the above statement to the first semicolon, and then
drawing the conclusion that this authorized the application of
the modern rule against perpetuities to legal contingent re-
mainders72 Lewis' statement was that, "It ought to almost ex-
cite surprise that so emphatic a declaration from the pen of
Fearne upon a point which intimately concerns contingent re-
mainders, has not had weight in the present controversy pro-
portioned to the value of his authority.' '1 3 Yet it plainly states
that Fearne considered his illustration a typical perpetuity, ab-
horred by the common law. It was not merely a type of trans-
action subject to the modern rule against perpetuities.
As showing that contingent remainders did not come under
the modern rule against perpetuities, we have the Third Report
of the Real Property Commissioners of England, a commission
formed in 1843. This body reported unanimously that:
"All future interests, not being remainders, are restrained
in their limits by the rules of law relating to perpetuities."' 4
They went on to recommend that the rule regarding the failure
of contingent remainders to vest in time should be changed by
legislation to the effect that every contingent remainder should
take effect if the particular estate determined before the re-
mainder vested "becoming in that event (after they were made
indestructible) liable to the rules prescribed for restraining per-
petuities." This body consisted of seven notable real property
lawyers. Butler in his edition of Fearne On Contingent Re-
nwinders says: The remoteness of a remainder, however great,
was no objection to its own creation."7 5 Lord Brougham said in
Cole v. Sewell,
"I was a good deal surprised to find that there was a ques-
tion raised about the remoteness of the limitation .... It
(the suggestion) opened my mind to a new and strange
view of the law, applying that to contingent remainders
72. Re Frost, 43 Ch. Div. 246 (1889).
73. Supra, note 70.
74. A copy of this report is included in Lewis, Law of Perpetuity (1843)
Appendix L
75. Fearne, Confingent Remainders (4th Am. ed. 1845) 565.
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which I always understood must be, from the very nature
of the thing, confined to springing uses and executory de-
vises."
76
Mr. Joshua Williams says, in substance, that there are two
important rules regarding the creation of common law contin-
gent remainders: First, the rule requiring that the seisin shall
never be without an owner, and second, the rule that if an estate
is given to an unborn person for life, followed by an estate to
any child of such person, the latter limitation is void. Williams
also states that, "it is in analogy to the restrictions thus imposed
on contingent remainders that the time limit in the modern rule
against remoteness was adopted. ' 77 Justice Kay stated in the
case of Whitby v. Mitchell,"8 "I do not want any authority than
that of the late Joshua Williams who was certainly one of the
best real property Lawyers that have existed in my life time,"
and Mr. Williams had upheld the existence of that rule as a
common law principle.
The conflict of statements by the various writers and judges
is unsatisfactory to Gray who demands authorities in the form
of decisions, not dicta. Kay, J. did, only five months later, in
Re Frost, hold that contingent remainders were subject to the
modern rule against perpetuities. 79 Space does not allow of a
more complete statement of the conflicting views. 0
III.
In the absence of express decision and of legislation making
all future interests of a contingent nature indestructible, the
common law incidents of contingent legal remainders have not
been abrogated in Missouri and other state jurisdictions.
Until the real property legislation in England in 1925, it was
the general consensus of opinion that there were two rules ap-
plicable to legal contingent remainders, the modern rule against
76. 2 H. L. C. 230, 4 Dru. & War. 1 (1843).
77. Williams, Law of Real Property (24th ed. 1926), rule 1 at p. 492,
rule 2 at p. 496.
78. 42 Ch. D. 494 (1889); 44 Ch. D. 85 (1890).
79. 43 Ch. D. 246 (1889).
80. A detailed review of the conflicting opinions is to be found in Sweet,
Can a Contingent Remainder be Void for Remoteness? (1905) 49 Sol. J.
414. In Re Ashforth, Farwell, J. lines up the authorities on the opposing
views and adopts the doctrine that the modern rule against perpetuities(remoteness) applies to legal contingent remainders. 1 Ch. 535 (1905).
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remoteness, and the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell."' Two leading
English cases sustain the application of the modern rule, Re
Frost and Re Ash forth. 2
In Re Frosth the testator devised freeholds to trustees upon
trust for his daughter for life and after her decease to the use
of any husband she might thereafter marry, with remainders
over to their children by appointment or otherwise, and an ulti-
mate remainder in default of issue. Kay, J. pointed out that
the daughter might have married a person not in existence at
the testator's death and goes o nto say that therefore the limita-
tions after the death of the daughter and her husband were void
for remoteness. He recognized the common law limit upon the
power to restrain alienation, saying:
"So that it would not merely be tied up for a life in being
and twenty-one years after, but for a life in being with re-
mainder for a life in being, with a contingent gift over."8 4
He admits that the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell is still in existence,
but simply decides that the new rule is all comprehensive and
that remote contingencies which would have been void as com-
mon law perpetuities are now void for remoteness if they exceed
the time limit of the modern rule. He also relied on the first half
of the quotation from Fearne, disregarding the latter part in
which Fearne was talking of a common law perpetuity in general
and not of the modern rule against remoteness. The decision is
simply a disregard of other existing law, and an arbitrary inter-
pretation of the modern rule against remoteness as a rigid gen-
eral rule. That this is a majority view there can be no doubt.
Is the rigidity of its application justifiable? Gray has main-
tained the doctrine of remoteness and rigidity of application and
has had wide acceptance." Another view seems more reasonable.
It is that advanced by Frazer and emphasizes what was certainly
the object of the common law courts since very early times, the
81. 22 Halsbury's, Laws of England (1912) 364, 365.
82. The two decisions are severely criticized by F. E. Farrer, 51 Law Q.
Rev. 668 (1935). He says: "that the contingent remainder failed as a con-
tingent remainder simply for not vesting during or eo instante with the
expiration of the only particular estate of freehold existing when the settle-
ment creating the remainder came into force" was sufficient basis for de-
ciding the case, and "any reference to the modern rule of perpetuity was
wholly otiose."
83. 43 Ch. D. 246 (1889).
84. Ibid., 259.
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insistence on the existence of a tenant who could alien within a
time that caused no great social inconvenience. He says:
"So the rule against perpetuities took the form of a rule
against remoteness in vesting, but its object was to prevent
an unreasonable postponement of the power of alienation by
a present tenant entitled to the fee. And where that object
is not served, the rule should not apply."''s
The application of the rule against remoteness in a case like in
Re Frost where the children of the testator's daughter must
come into existence before her death, no matter what husband
she marries, is an example of a return to the mediaeval logic and
the syllogism in modern times.
The second case, Re Ashforth, 7 is relied upon more strongly
than the preceding case as demonstrating the applicability of the
rule against remoteness to contingent legal remainders. Farwell,
J. said it would be sufficient for him to follow the decision of
Kay, J. in Re Frost, but that he preferred considering the point
himself. The testatrix, M. S. Ashforth, had devised real estate
to trustees to pay the rents to her three named children and the
survivors of them, and from the decease of the longest liver of
such children to pay the rents equally among all such of the
children born in her life time and within 21 years. After the
death of all said grandchildren except one, the estate went to
such survivor in tail with remainder over in fee. Testatrix died
in 1864, one of her three children died leaving three children in
1870, who are the applicants of the summons in this cas6, and
the other two children of testatrix died without issue. The ques-
tion was whether the limitation in tail was too remote.
On behalf of the plaintiffs it was urged that this limitation to
the surviving child in tail was a legal contingent remainder sup-
ported by a particular estate vested in trustees and their heirs
during the lives of the grandchildren. If unaffected by any other
restraining rule than that forbidding estates to the children of
unborn children who were given prior interests, it was valid
since it was supported by a particular estate of freehold on the
determination of which it must vest in possession. Justice Far-
85. Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sec. 820.
86. Frazer, Rationale of the Rule against Perpetuities (1922) 6 Minn.
L. Rev. 560, 570.
87. 1 Ch. 535 (1905) 21 T. L. R. 329; 49 Sol. J. 350.
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well disagreed with Justice Kay's idea that there was such a
common law rule as that enunciated in Whitby v. Mitchell, and
accepted Gray as an authority who had superseded Joshua Wil-
liams. Justice Byrne's statement in Re Hollis Hospital," "new
statutes and the course of social development gives rise to new
aspects and conditions which have to be regarded in applying
the old principles" appealed to Farwell, J. He saw an analogy
between applying the modern rule to contingent remainders and
Byrne, J. applying that rule to remote rights of reentry for con-
dition broken; also to Jessel, M. R. applying it to equitable con-
tingent remainders.
The analogy to Byrne's problem is not good, since there was
no new social aspect in connection with contingent remainders,
and there could be said to be a social need in the matter of re-
mote rights of redntry for condition broken. With regard to
equitable contingent remainders it would seem that Farwell, J.
did not see that a decision based on the doctrines of equity
stressed by Jessel, M. R. was not analogous to the situation he
faced. In the case of Abbiss v. Burney" there was a devise of a
freehold to trustees to pay the rents to A for life, and after his
death to convey the estate to such son of B as should first attain
25 years. At testator's death B was living and no son of his had
attained the age of 25 years. It was held by Jessel, M. R. that
the equitable remainder was void since it was not confined within
a period of 21 years after lives in being. It was said, however,
that the result would have been otherwise had the remainder
been legal instead of equitable for in such case it must neces-
sarily have taken effect immediately upon the death of A or not
at all. The rule that a contingent remainder must take effect on
or before the termination of the preceding estate is not applica-
ble in equity. In equity, if the persons entitled to the remainder
cannot be ascertained at that time, the chancellor will subse-
quently enforce a trust in favor of those persons who afterwards
fulfill the description of the donees of the gift. Clearly this ap-
plication of equitable doctrine makes an equitable contingent re-
mainder indestructible by a break in the seisin and justifies an
application of the rule against remoteness. Farwell, J. said, "It
88. 2 Ch. 540, 552 (1889).
89. 17 Ch. Div. 211 (1881).
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is plain that the courts have acted on the principle that the rule
against perpetuities is to be applied where no other sufficient
protection against remoteness is attainable," and concluded there
was no such protection offered in Re Ashforth. Testatrix died
in 1864 and the case was decided in 1905. The legislation of
1845, The Real Property Limitation Act,s0 had abolished tortious
operation of feoffments, and further provided that contingent
remainders were to be protected against forfeiture, surrender
or merger of the particular estate. The protection through de-
structibility had largely disappeared since the above act was
applicable to the estate involved. That feature does not seem
to have been raised, or at least discussed. It may well be that
when contingent remainders are made indestructible, the modern
rule applies.,,
It would seem that the reasoning in the two leading cases
above is not strong support for the applicability of the modern
rule against remoteness to legal contingent remainders in Mis-
souri, to say nothing of their being conclusive. Actually they
had no effect on the local problem.
Another case requiring attention before examining the Mis-
souri cases, is Whitby v. Mitehell,2 in which was enunciated
what has been sometimes called the common law rule against
remoteness, as contrasted with the modern rule against perpe-
tuities or remoteness. An agreement provided life estates for
the husband and wife, then there was a limitation of a legal life
estate to an unborn child of named persons who were the bene-
ficiaries of an antenuptial agreement, followed by a remainder
to the children of that unborn child. In the Court of Appeal in
1890 all three Lord Justices, Cotton, Lindley and Lopes gave
opinions sustaining Kay, J. who had held that there was a rule
forbidding the limitation for the life of an unborn person with a
limitation after his death to his unborn children. Further all
three agree that it was not the same as, and was not supplanted
by, the modern rule against remoteness. The existence of any
such rule as that laid down by Kay, J. and sustained by the
Court of Appeals is disputed by Gray 3 and Farwell, J. in Re
90. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4 and 8. (1845).
91. Kales, Future Interests (1920) sec. 662.
92. 42 Ch. D. 494 (1887); 44 Ch. D. 85 (1890).
93. Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) secs. 133; 191-199;
298a-298i; 931-947, and articles by Sweet and others cited. See note 80.
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Ashforth. This rule has many supporters among the scholars
of England as a part of the common law. It is, unless over-
ruled by legislation or decision, in force as a part of the corn-,
mon law in Missouri.
There can be no doubt that the common law destructibility
of legal contingent remainders was in effect in most American
jurisdictions until, as in England, legislation, and in rare in-
stances judicial decision, made them indestructible. A number
of decisions could be cited. 5 Thus in Appeal of Miflin" the court
says:
"The estate of M- was destructible by her own act. It
was entirely within her power to become the owner of the
fee simple of the estates granted. It proves nothing to say
she did not exercise her power... But in considering the
application of the rule against perpetuities, that rule re-
quires that the estates in question should be indestructible,
and an estate which can be destroyed by the person who
holds it for the time being is not indestructible."
In Caldwell v. Willis97 the Mississippi Supreme Court said that
a future limitation is void if it may not vest within the period
of the rule, "except when the limitation is by way of contingent
remainder, which may be cut off by the alienation of the par-
ticular tenant (which liability to be defeated in this way is the
reason for the exception)." In a recent article on the destructi-
bility of an estate tail in Missouri,98 and by that it is supposed
the writer meant the statutory replacement of the English fee
tail, a life estate in the first taker with a (contingent) remainder
to the heirs of the body, and a consequent possibility of revertor
to the transferor and his heirs, the following conclusion was
reached:
Bordwell, Iowa Contingent Remainder Law (1925) 10 Ia. Law Bull. 282,
says, "The rule is the outgrowth of English Family settlement and of the
tradition of the small group of conveyancing specialists which the English
family settlement produced."
94. See supra, note 63.
95. Bond v. Moore, 236 Ill. 576, 86 N. E. 386, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 540(1908); Kales, Future Interests (1920) sees. 310-314; Faber v. Police
10 S. C. 376 (1877).
96. 121 Pa. 205, 224, 15 AtI. 525 (1888).
97. 57 Miss. 555, 573 (1880).
98. Ely, Can an Estate Tail be Docked During the Life of the First
Taker? (1931) Univ. of Mo. Bull., Law Series 45. Hudson, Land Tenures
and Conveyances in Missouri (1915) Univ. of Mo. Bull. Law Series 3, p. 17,
"There would seem to be nothing to prevent a feoffment from having a
tortious operation."
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"The interest of contingent remainder men in a Missouri
estate tail ought to be held destructible either by a merger
of the life estate of the first taker with the reversion or by
a tortuous feoffment of the life estate. Yet there are no
decisions so holding. It would seem that, in the light of the
existing decisions, partition of such an estate cannot be had,
and that there is some question as to whether or not entailed
lands are subject to condemnation, .... Faced with these
economic facts (that commerce demands freely alienable
urban lands) it is believed that the court should, in every
possible and legitimate manner, favor the destructibility of
entailed estates, and that the common law docrtines of
merger and tortuous feoffment should therefore be applied
in the manner indicated..."
With no decisions to the contra, it is to be kept in mind that
"tortious feoffment" is indicated. A conveyance by the life
tenant operating under the Statute of Uses would, of course, pass
only his life estate.99 His possession cannot be adverse to the
remainderman, except under the most exceptional circumstance,
such as an ouster, 00 and the Statute of Limitations does not run
against the remainderman until he has a right to possession. 101
All of the foregoing militate in some measure against the doc-
trine of destructibility except by merger or a tortious feoffment
and on these we have no cases. However the common law doc-
trine of destructibility applies if the contingency does not happen
so that there is no contingent remainderman in existence to take
at the termination of the supporting estate. The doctrine of valid
executory interests created to arise in the future (without a
supporting estate) under Missouri statute does not as yet apply
to contingent remainders. An analysis of Buxton V. KIroeger'0 2
shows that the estate to arise ten years after the date when the
youngest child reached twenty-one was not a contingent re-
mainder, but a springing contingent interest. Destructibility
still exists so as to make unnecessary the application of the
99. Foote v. Sanders, 72 Mo. 616 (1880); In McConnell v. Deal, 296 Mo.
275, 246 S. W. 594 (1922), the court would not approve a sale of land for
the benefit of the life tenant while subject to a contingent remainder. This
has been made possible by statute in certain situations. R. S. Mo. 1929,
see. 1546. In the McConnel case Graves, J., wanted a trustee appointed to
preserve the contingent remainders in the price of the land.
100. Salmon v. Davis, 29 Mo. 176, 131 (1859) cited in Armor v. Frey;
253 Mo. 447, 161 S. W. 829 (1913).
101. Hall v. French, 165 Mo. 430, 442, 65 S. W. 769 (1901).
102. 219 Mo. 224, 117 S. W. 1147 (1908).
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modern rule against remoteness to contingent remainders in
Missouri.
Next we consider the existence of the rule in Whitby v.
Mitchell as an additional reason for not applying the modern
rule against perpetuities. The first case in which the invalidity
of a contingent remainder for remoteness was in issue in Mis-
souri was Lockridge v. Mace.103 There was a devise to the widow
for life, remainder to testator's children, remainder over to his
grandchildren and remainder in fee to their children.. The court
cited 1 Washburn, On Real Property (5th ed. 1887) p. 115 and
vol. 2 of the same work, p. 760. The first gives two rules, that
of Whitby v. Mitchell, and the modern rule against remoteness,
the second the principle of certainty of vesting rather than the
possibility of vesting under the modern rule. The court also
cited Gray, sec. 214, and held the remainders to the last class
void. (The court then went on to hold the whole disposition in-
valid because of the tainted portion. Gray has criticized the
Missouri court for holding the entire disposition void and points
out that the authorities cited do not sustain such a result,10 4 but
the same result was later reached as to entire invalidity in Shep-
perd v. Fisher.)10 Hudson says this decision makes it clear that
"the rule against remoteness applies as well to contingent re-
mainders as to executory devises.' ' 10 6 If this decision settles the
question of the applicability of the rule against remoteness to
contingent remainders, nothing further need be said. The court
seems to have approved the statement of Washburn as well as
that of Gray. The court recognized the invalidity of an estate
over to the unborn child of an unborn child to whom the preced-
ing estate had been given, but applied the rule against perpetui-
ties to it. In Gates v. Seibert07 the disposition was held valid,
but the court would apparently have applied the rule against
perpetuities (remoteness) if it had not been within the time
limit. It said, "But the limitation was such that if he should
103. 109 Mo. 162, 18 S. W. 1145 (1892).
104. Ibid., p. 22. Gray, Rule against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915) sec.
249a.
105. Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 245-247, 103 S. W. 989 (1907).
106. Hudson, The Rule against Perpetuities (1914) Univ. of Mo. Bull.
Law Series 3, p. 12.
107. Melvin v. Hoffman, 157 Mo. 254, 270, 57 S. W. 1067 (1900). "The
rule does not apply to a vested remainder nor to a contingent remainder
which vests within the time."
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have a child the estate in remainder would vest in that child
certainly within ten months after the death of the father, even
though the mother survived him more than twenty-one years.
Therefore we hold that the fifth clause of the will was not re-
pugnant to the rule against perpetuities." The court cited 2
Washburn, On Real Property (5th ed. 1887) p. 605, 606, which
includes the statement "an executory devise to be valid must"
(come within the rule against perpetuities)- "But this does not
apply to remainders whether contingent or vested ;" Citations
were also given from Gray's Rule against Per-petuities. In Brad-
ford v. BlossomlB the applicability of the rule against perpetui-
ties to contingent remainders is again implicit in the court's
opinion, though not requisite to the decision. It was said, "By
this paragraph of the will the trustee is given the power to hold
the property during the lives in being, Frank and Carrie, and
during the lives not in being-of children which night be born
of Carrie after the death of the testatrix, an equitable interest
in remainder arising at the natural termination of the first lives."
Abbis v. Burney"'0 was not mentioned. Shepperd v. Fisher10
presented for consideration a life estate to a widow, remainder
to her daughter Mary for life, remainder to Mary's bodily heirs,
with a devise over if the grandchildren died without issue. In-
stead of holding that the limitation to Mary's bodily heirs was a
remainder in fee subject to a limitation over on failure of is-
sue,110a the court construed the limitation to Mary's bodily heirs
to be a life estate subject to enlargement into a fee if the heirs
had issue. The only analogy to such an estate would be the fee
conditional at common law. The court held this enlargement and
ensuing fee, as well as the executory devise over on failure of
such issue to be within the rule against perpetuities and void.
The non-sequitur that the whole disposition was therefore void
has been referred to.11 The case is a tangle of inconsistencies
but the rule against remoteness was applied, and was applied to
what was actually a contingent (though defeasible) remainder
108. 190 Mo. 110, 88 S. W. 721 (1905); 207 Mo. 177, 105 S. W. 289(1907).
109. 17 Ch. D. 211 (1881).
110. 206 Mo. 208, 103 S. W. 989 (1907).
ll0a. A like situation was properly construed in Schee v. Boone, 295 Mo.
212, 243 S. W. 882 (1922).
111. See supra, note 105.
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in fee. Again citations were given from both Washburn and
Gray. It was stated that the purpose of the rule was to prevent
perpetuities because they restrained alienation,1 2 and Miflin's
Appeal"' was cited from Washburn's text. Gray was cited in
support of the idea that "In the states where those statutes exist
(against destructibility of remainders) the rule of perpetuities
applies with equal reason and force to vested as it does to con-
tingent remainders." 13 Again the court said, that Mary might
have children born after the mother's death, and such children
might have children who, if they survived would be included as
remaindermen. "It is thus seen that under the fifth clause of
the will the estate may not vest until the birth of an unborn
child of an unborn child."'1 4 So the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell is
in the mind of the court and is associated with the contingent
remainder, but the modern rule against perpetuities (remote-
ness) is applied. Nothing can be held determined by this case
except that the provisions in the will were void, but there is the
suggestion running throughout that the court is still of the opin-
ion that the contingent remainder is subject to the rule against
perpetuities (remoteness).
Turning to statutory indestructibility, the case of Buxton v.
Kroeger"15 is only worth discussing because it might be inter-
preted as an exception to the statement that no Missouri case
hag held a contingent remainder indestructible.- 6 Though called
a contingent remainder in the opinion, the interest involved was
a contingent executory limitation. A deed conveyed the title to
a trustee for the sole and separate use of the wife during life
with certain powers in her, then to the use of the husband if he
survived the wife. Thereafter the trustee was to collect the rents
for their surviving children until ten years after the youngest
came of age, when the trust was to cease and the title was to
pass to and become vested in fee in said children then living, or
the heirs at law of such of the children as had died in the mean-
time. Regarding the gap of ten years after the death of the prior
life tenant, the court said,
112. Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 239, 103 S. W. 989 (1907).
113. Ibid., p. 241.
114. Ibid., p. 244.
115. 219 Mo. 224, 117 S. W. 1147 (1908).
116. Supra, note 98.
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"It is a sufficient answer to the inquiry to say that under the
provisions of R. S. Mo. 1899, sec. 4596 (now R. S. Mo. 1929,
sec. 3112) it was not necessary that there should be any es-
tate created between the end of the life estate and the vest-
ing of the estate in remainder. It was expressly ruld by this
court in O'Day v. Meadows (1906) 194 Mo. 588, that an
estate may be created by deed to commence in the future
without any intervening estate to support the same. But
aside from all this in our opinion, under the provisions of
this deed the legal title to the real estate embraced in such
deed was vested in the trustee, and he held the same until
the period fixed for the termination of the trust which was
10 years after the youngest child reached its majority.
(Italics ours) 11%
Two points seem to be wrongly judged here. The statute cited
did make it possible to create an interest to arise in the future by
deed as well as by will but it did not make that interest a con-
tingent remainder or change the common law characteristics of
such a remainder. It made possible a new future interest, really
possible under the Statute of Uses, but theretofore not recognized
by our court. But in the O'Day v. Meadows case, it was held
that when such an estate is to arise in the future it must vest
in interest in the grantees at the time of execution of the instru-
ment. Here it was vested at once in the trustees, not in the sur-
viving children. Valliant, C. J. dissenting, spoke of the Statute
of Uses executing the legal title, but he would not have said this
of a contingent remainder. Woodson, J., in a separate dissent
thought the rule against perpetuities should be applied because
it was possible for the unborn child of an unborn child who was
given an interest to succeed to that interest, as a purchaser. The
case is not authority for the indestructibility of contingent re-
mainders on the theory that, if not in existence when the sup-
porting estate terminates, they may be considered estates "to
arise in the future" like executory devises. The only preserva-
tion of contingent remainders by statute in Missouri is the sav-
ing in favor of posthumous children.li? This is the first portion
of the statute above quoted. Like Shepperd v. Fisher, this case
contains a number of confused ideas and is valuable only as a
decision on the facts involved.
116a. 219 Mo. 224, 256, 117 S. W. 1147 (1908).
117. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 3112. See. 3113, ibid., prevents posthumous chil-




The fundamental distinctions laid down by Fearne"'8 seem to
have been lost sight of by our court during this period:
"A contingent remainder may be limited in conveyances
at common law; it relates only to lands, tenements and
hereditaments, real or mixed; it requires a freehold to pre-
cede and support it, and must vest at farthest, at the instant
the preceding estates determine ... An executory devise is
admitted only in last wills and testaments; it respects per-
sonal estates as well as real; it requires no preceding estate
to support it; and if there be any preceding estate, it is not
necessary that the executory devise should vest when the
preceding estate determines."
The same distinction applies to executory limitations by deed.
This distinction was recognized and clearly stated in Sullivan v.
Gareschel ' which involved the necessity of vesting of a contin-
gent remainder on or before the determination of a particular
prior estate, and the lack of that feature in an executory devise.
The distinction is also clearly drawn in Deacon v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co.12' There is, moreover no statute prohibiting the de-
struction of contingent interests by merger or tortious feoff-
ment.'2 1 The statute defining the construction of dying without
issue, failure of issue and the like, i. e., making such a provision
definite failure of issue has, of course, rendered many possible
instances of executory limitations on indefinite failure of issue
impossible,122 but our concern is with contingent remainders.
Whether the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, i. e. no remainder is
valid which is limited to the unborn child of an unborn person
to whom the prior estate was given, is part of the common law
of Missouri has been disputed. 123 In Lockridge v. Mace 24 it ap-
pears in approved quotations from Washburn. In Shepperd v.
Fishe12s a passage from Washburn is again cited and it con-
tains the same statement regarding two rules, the one in ques-
tion, and the modern rule against perpetuities. On page 244 the
court said:
118. Fearne, Contingent Renwinders (4th Am. ed. 1845) 418.
119. 229 Mo. 496, 509, 129 S. W. 949, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 605 (1910).
120. 271 Mo. 669, 197 S. W. 261 (1917).
121. See supra, note 99.
122. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 3109.
123. 2 Powell, Tnists and Estates (1933) 243 n.; 2 Simes, Future In-
terests (1936) see. 487.
124. 109 Mo. 162, 18 S. W. 1145 (1892).
125. 206 Mo. 208, 238, 103 S. W. 989 (1907).
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"Such births are not only possible but highly probable, in
fact, such a child has been born unto Susan Ellen Shepperd
since the death of the testator. It is thus seen that the estate
under the fifth clause of the will may not vest until the birth
of an unborn child of an unborn child; and that under the
sixth paragraph it cannot vest in fee in the child born since
the death of the testator unto the said Susan Ellen Shepperd
until it also has issue born, which will be beyond the allotted
time prescribed by the rule, because such issue would be the
unborn issue of the unborn bodily heirs of said Susan Ellen
Shepperd."
The court then applies the modern rule against perpetuities. So
far both decisions show a recognition of the facts necessary for
a simple application of the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, and then
apply the modern rule instead. In Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co.1 26 the court quotes from 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. Low (2d ed.)
p. 703 defining a perpetuity as "a future limitation, whether
executory or by way of remainder, and of either real or per-
sonal property, which is not to vest until after the expiration
of, or will not necessarily vest within the period fixed and pre-
scribed by law for the creation of future estates and interests
and which is not destructible by the persons for the time being
entitled to the property subject to the future limitation, except
with the concurrence of the individual interested in the limita-
tion." (Italics ours)
The court then quotes from Gray, whose third edition was then
available, the definition now generally accepted.2 7 The court on
page 177 quotes the language of Buxton v. Kroeger with respect
to O'Day v. Meadows,128 and its misinterpretation is swallowed
whole. Then on page 180 we find: "consequently we would have
a case where the unborn child of an unborn child might take
under the will in question, an interest in and to the trust estate
created thereby. This is so obviously a violation of the rule
126. 298 Mo. 148, 170, 249 S. W. 629 (1923).
127. Gill, Law of Real Property in Missoui (1924) see. 817, states:
"Any remainder or estate which can by any possibility take effect later than
a life or lives in being plus twenty-one years is void because contra to the
rule against perpetuities." It is stated in Blackhurst v. Johnson, 72 F. (2d)
664 (1934) thus, "Under Missouri Law no future interest, whether legal or
equitable, is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years and
10 months after termination of life or lives in being at the time of the crea-
tion of the interest."
128. Supra, note 116a.
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against perpetuities that it is only necessary to copy" (from
Shepperd v. Fisher). To the suggestion that the possibility of
an interest going to an unborn child of an unborn child who had
been given an interest was not a serious matter, the court cited
the passage from Shepperd v. Fisher,-9 and said it was nothing
to jest about. From page 180 to 184 the court cites the cases we
have discussed above and quotes from some of them. The result
is a confusion of confused ideas which can be stated only in the
mixture of the two rules: That where there is a limitation of
an interest to an unborn person and a remainder to that person's
child, the disposition is too remote and falls within the rule
against perpetuities. Again the court held the whole disposition
void as in Lockridge v. Mace and Shepperd v. Fisher.10
In Lane v. Garrison 131 there was a limitation to trustees to pay
a portion of the income of a portion of the estate to a grandson
for life (leaving out immaterial provisions) and to the grand-
son's issue when they reached the age of twenty-one, with pro-
visions over on failure of issue. After deciding the case, the court
by way of dictum in answer to an attempt to raise the issue of
validity under the Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, (after pointing out
that this issue raised first on appeal was a departure from the
theory of the petition) said:
"But it is urged that the whole provision as to the trust
fund in question is void because it violates the rule as to
perpetuities, in that an unborn child of an unborn child of
said Clark Garrison might take thereunder .... But we do
not regard this fact as in and of itself violating the rule as to
perpetuities if said unborn child must be born or take, if it
takes at all, within a life or lives in being and twenty-one
years and the period of gestation thereafter."
We must keep in mind that the point was not in issue, and that
the limitation was not in the express form of a limitation to the
unborn child of an unborn child. It was to the issue of Clark
Garrison if he have issue. That, under the statutes of Missouri,
must mean issue living at the death of the named taker, so any
interest over to his issue must vest at his death or not at all.
As a contingent remainder which would vest on his death or not
at all, it was destructible and did not fall under either rule
129. Supra, note 125.
1.0. Supra, note 105.
1:31. 293 Mo. 530, 239 S. W. 813 (1922).
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against perpetuities. This case cannot be said to do away with
the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, if it were conceded that such a
rule exists in Missouri.
It would seem that the Missouri supreme court does not con-
sider the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell eliminated, since in 1933 in
Greenleaf v. Greenleaf 3 2 the court had occasion to consider the
application of the rule and, after a clear exposition of the issue
regarding its existence, said: "It is, however, unnecessary for us
further to discuss the rule, or whether it has been abrogated by
the rule against perpetuities or is in fact but an instance of that
rule; to do so would be, so far as this case is concerned, a dis-
cussion of a moot question. The rule has no application to the
devise in question." Thus we have no decision that the rule in
Whitby v. Mitchell is not the law in Missouri, but there are at
least five cases in which the substance of the rule is stated and
the modern rule against remoteness is unnecessarily applied.
The Missouri court took Washburn's 1887 edition and Gray's
first edition of 1886 and applied both in the Locicridge v. Mace
case in 1892. Whitby v. Mitchell has been decided in 1887, and
Re Frost in 1889, but neither was noticed. In Lockridge v. Mace
the court seems to have taken the first rule of Washburn (the
rule in Whitby v. Mitchell) and used it as an instance of the
rule laid down by Gray. The succeeding cases repeated this con-
struction and in succeeding cases derived their authority from
Washburn, Gray, The American and English Encyclopedia of
Law and prior decisions of their own court, repeating the rrors
until we have them all gathered in one case, Loud v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co. in 1923. In the meantime Re Ashforth had been
decided in 1904 before Shepperd v. Fisher (1907), Buxton v.
Kroeger (1908) and the others commented on herein. In fact but
two, the Lockridge case and Gates v. Seibert preceded the three
important English cases and Whitby v. Mitchell was not even
discussed until 1933 in Greenleaf v. Greenleaf. The destructi-
bility of contingent remainders as an antidote for perpetuities
seems to have been overlooked altogether. There are no statutes
making contingent remainders indestructible. We are uncertain
whether the rule of Whitby v. Mitchell is law in Missouri or not.




The distinction between contingent remainders and executory
limitations is not clearly drawn.
It seems that we may fairly say that the rule against perpe-
tuities does apply to contingent remainders in Missouri, but that
the results have been arrived at without any definite elimination
of the destructibility element or of the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell.
They could exist and in the past have continued side by side.
The object of all three was to prevent perpetuities in the form
of undue restraints on alienation. That the enforcement of the
modern rule according to the letter is not always desirable is
seen in the varying attitudes of the judges in facing situations
in which they say there arises no undue inconvenience to the
public.1 3 It might be well to look at the statement of Powell1 34
in what may be considered the latest acceptable attitude toward
the matter:
"The fact of alienability is unduly suspended when the
possibility that the indestructible and contingent character
of the future interest will continue for more than the per-
missible period, make it unlikely that the owners of the
future and other interests will unite in a conveyance of the
complete ownership. While phrased frequently as a rule
against remoteness of vesting, the common law rule against
perpetuities is merely an extension of the judicial safeguards
of alienability." (Italics supplied).
With the foregoing in mind, it is to be hoped that the court
will have an opportunity to definitely state whether the modern
rule is now our exclusive remedy in problems of perpetuities.
133. Gill, The Rule Against Perpetuities as it Affects Contingent Future
Interests in Missouri (1936) 21 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW 209.
134. 12 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1935) 82.
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